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MOUNT MADONNA SCHOOL
Interview with Thomas Pickering
Undersecretary
of State
May 16th, 2000
Mr. Pickering: Good morning, nice to see you
all.
Mr. Mailliard: Good morning we're grateful
there was no crisis today. You know we were going
to see you last year, but you wound up in Germany
dealing with Kosovo.
Mr. Pickering: I apologize, for last year and
for this year. I was just in a briefing with the Secretary
of State. It took a little longer than I thought it
would. And so she sends apologies, I send apologies.
We know that you're reasonably short on time, and
I would be glad to try to stay a little longer than
I had planned, in order to try to give you a full
shot at me, while we're here.
What I would suggest we do, (turns to aide) maybe
Grant, we'll put the next appointment off till later
in the day, or reschedule it. And I will try to cut
down on my introductory remarks by just saying a few
things, if you like, but since this looks all choreographed
and scripted, I don't want to interrupt the flow of
events that--
Mr. Mailliard: We're choreographed, scripted,
and ready to be spontaneous.
Mr. Pickering: Okay, good. I'd like to both
welcome you and tell you I'm very pleased to see you,
and am delighted to have a chance to speak with you.
I think you may know something about what I do, I'm
the number three person in the (State) Department
in hierarchical terms, but I tend to cover political
questions, very broadly spread out across the landscape;
things that the Secretary isn't immediately working
on. I sort of backstop, and the same with the Deputy
Secretary. She has a kind of universal appetite for
subjects and we all have to run fast to stay up with
her. But she works intensively on the Middle East,
on a lot of our big issues, Russia and China, for
example. And I backstop her on a lot of those questions.
Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary, works on the
Russia issue extensively, on NATO, some of the European
questions, and some of the issues in other parts of
the world--Which leaves me a very broad universe to
cover, and over the last couple of days, I've been
working on questions in Africa, Sierra Leone, and
peacekeeping, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
And I'll work on and other issues we will be facing,
including Zimbabwe. I was Friday in Colombia, to talk
to the Colombians about our program with health ,
and where that is going. Over the last four or five
days, have spent time with visitors from Europe and
Africa and from Asia. And I'm involved in lots of
those issues that we're watching very carefully (like)
the Taiwan Straits issues, with the inauguration of
President Chen in Taiwan is coming up, and the very
important statement that he will be making about their
policies.
And so almost anything that one way or another comes
to our attention, that has significant political content,
I inevitably get involved. And I also do a certain
amount of crisis management for the State Department
and participate in the interagency activities that
are related.
I hope that's enough of an introduction, and I don't
think I'll deter any of your questions, so why don't
we go ahead and start talking with you, about things
that are on your minds, or that you would like to
talk to me about, and what you would like to have
me respond to.
Aaron: Well, good morning, Undersecretary Pickering.
In one speech you gave, you said "Our challenge is
not to devise some idealistic new order for ourselves
and our world, but to redirect ourselves to our own
best traditions." What are those traditions?
Mr. Pickering: Well I think that it's an important
question, and one that I meant seriously when I said
it. And I think our own best traditions are, first
and foremost, the promotion of democracy, as an important
aspect of American foreign policy.
And secondly, closely coupled with that, is the need
for us to do what we can in economic and social areas,
to help countries find ways out of the difficult circumstances
in which they find themselves. That these kinds of
questions are accompanied in the broader sense, by
our new focus on human rights, as the Carter administration
initiated, but has been covered by all the other administrations.
(There is) the tradition of being able to defend ourselves
and our people in times of adversity, whether that
means against military attack, or against economic
adversity. These are all, I think, part of our best
traditions as Americans. And part of what we believe
comes with us, as now the unrivaled leaders of the
world community.
It also means, I think, that we have to look at our
foreign policy and its style, in ways that make us
less peremptory, more persuasive, more part of the
world community, rather than some remote kind of chauffeur
of the international body politic. We have to be both
in the front seat and in the back seat at the same
time. Or, we have to be in the driver's seat of the
bus, but we also have to see ourselves as passengers.
And that we have to have a vote on where we go, one
way or the other. So it is a sense of cooperation
and teamwork internationally that is part of our domestic
tradition.
It is a sense, too, that we as human beings bear responsibilities,
particularly in the light of our fantastic endowments
as a country, and indeed, the way in which we have
been able to develop those, to give us this unrivaled
position in the international community.
Josh: In an address before the Fletcher School
of Law, you said, "The Cold War struggle between democracy
and dictatorship has given way to the struggle between
the forces of integration and disintegration. And
the Cold War challenges have given way to the challenge
of managing constant dynamic and accelerating change."
Could you say more about this?
Mr. Pickering: I would like to, because I think
that.... I wonder where you got all these quotes.
I didn't know I said so many things that anybody would
ever look at.
But I think that it is particularly
important for us to try to define our times, in foreign
policy, in ways that can give us clues about how to
develop our foreign policy, what to expect down the
road, and how to continue to be out in front, rather
than caught behind.
In that sense, I think that we had a tendency, particularly
as the Cold War recedes further in time, to look at
it in very simplistic terms. In black or white, we
or they, up or down.
Some of that is true, and some of that
is less true, but there is a feeling, I think particularly
as the Cold War recedes, to try to define it in easy
terms. And many of us who were practitioners of foreign
policy in the Cold War did indeed find it easier to
mobilize American international position, monies in
the Congress, and support from allies, if in fact
they perceived that we understood that a particular
set of movements against it was a "communist threat."
That's disappeared.
Secondly, in our own domestic policy, we are and have
been for two hundred and twenty years, engaged in
a struggle between those who want to be part of the
world community, play in it, and see our future tied
up in the world community-- And those who would rather
focus the undivided amount of attention they can muster
on domestic affair, and purely on domestic issues.
And I think the new universe that we face, with globalization,
with the fact that maybe thirty percent of all of
our new jobs, is derived from our ability to trade
outside our borders, means, in fact, that this struggle
between integrationists and isolationists, is very
much more a part of what I would call reality, rather
than theory. And as a result, I think it is one of
the defining concepts of where we are. I think also,
the dynamics of the world that we deal with are increasingly
speeded up. It is hard to believe that the speed of
electrons so dominates so much of what we have to
do, and how we have to react. But indeed it's the
case. Now, the telegraph was invented in what, 1840s,
but in fact, the world is now wired, or the world
is wireless together, in ways that we never anticipated
before, and which you see very clearly in your own
lives. And it makes a huge difference where we're
going. So I, these are three perhaps of the factors
that I think characterize where we are now.
I would add to that the fact that much of conflict,
which we have to be concerned with, because it's part
of our foreign policy concern, comes from new kinds
of sources of conflict, or the resurgence of old horses.
Some of it is tribalism and ethnic conflict, some
of it is national jealousies, some of it is competitive
views about economic prosperity: where it comes from,
who gives it to you, and how you get it. But it has
meant, in fact, that the Cold War, which seemed maybe
historically, to put a kind of iron lid over a lot
of people's propensity to use force to resolve questions,
maybe because of their concern that it would involve
them in an international dynamic. The end result of
which was difficult to perceive, has been lifted.
And so the iron lid is no longer on a lot of the conflicts,
and conflict situations we have to deal with. We have
to find new ways to deal with them, or we have to
adopt and adapt old ways.
And one of those, of course, is the use of international
organizations. It's interesting that the isolationists
see almost no value in international organizations.
The integrationist sees a huge amount of value, whether
it is everything from regulating the air spaces of
the world, to finding ways to bring together peacekeepers,
or indeed, peace enforcers, when the case requires,
to deal with a particular set of problems and to muster
diplomacy in between.
Finally, I would say these, of course, these internal
arguments and difficulties, and differences, have
a lot to do with the existential question for the
Department of State; do we, or does the Secretary,
and the President, have enough funding to provide,
for dealing with a wide range of questions we're involved
in? It is interesting, the world may be more, may
be closer, may be moving more rapidly, in a sense,
may be more potentially conflicted in a lot of these
questions, and therefore, there is in our view, a
much more significant role for diplomacy to play its
part in conflict avoidance, conflict prevention, or
early resolution. But in fact, you can't do the job
very well without the tools. And some of those tools
are assistance programs, some of those tools are the
ability to have enough well-trained diplomats to do
the job. Some of those tools are to be represented
around the world, so that you know what's going on,
to have a functioning intelligence community that
could provide you with early warning.
And to have a significant backup of military capacity,
which both influences the outcome of a lot of people's
thinking at the diplomatic stage, but also provides
you with the kind of ultimate safety net that you
require, should you need to evacuate Americans or
indeed, to participate in peacekeeping. And all of
this requires funding. Interestingly enough, Congress
has a great propensity, particularly in the fusion
of the integrationists and the isolationists, to support
the military end of the spectrum, that's easy to sell.
Even though it's a lot more expensive, and God forbid
that we should have to use it all the time. And to
stint the humanitarian end of the spectrum, as a result,
it makes the most expensive end of the spectrum much
more likely to be used, and much more likely to be
more costly than it is already.
So we think that this is backwards. Secretary Albright
and many of us have been arguing, with the public
and with the Congress, about a need to begin to think
about these issues, as a continuum of national security.
And one that is interrelated, and one, the stinting
of one end of which becomes more costly at the other
end, and that's the end, in fact, where the price
is in blood as well as in (inaudible) bucket. And
so we think that we haven't got our priorities yet
right in the Congress on these questions, in the main.
Thank you for the chance to give you a commercial.
Jenny: I have another quote. Peter Burkhart
(phonetic), a professor of Religion and Sociology
at Boston University said, "We cannot afford to think
of the problems of our own society as if we were alone
in the world." Do you think that we as Americans live
too much in isolation, and do we need to develop a
greater awareness of other countries?
Mr. Pickering: Well, I think that the quote
is a good one, I agree with it. And I think that one
can begin to draw conclusions. I think that we have
had, this maybe is a way of analyzing some of the,
intellectually, some of the integrationist/isolationist
argument.
We have had for many years, the luxury of having two
very large seas between us and many (of our) potential
enemies. And this was certainly true at the time when
I was your age, a thousand years ago-(laughter) When,
in fact, we hadn't been touched by international wars
very greatly, and as a result, could be comfortable
sitting at home, and where the arguments (for doing
so) were much more persuasive.
We are also a continental country, and I have a thesis
about continental countries. Continental countries
are those like Russia, the United States, Canada,
and maybe India and Australia, which in fact cover
such vast land areas, that they do enjoy a sense of
separation and isolation.
If one compares, for example, the language abilities
of the Dutch or the Belgians, and the language abilities
of the Americans, you will see, in fact, one of my
theses about a continental country, in comfort, in
the large size. And the separation means in fact,
that individuals can safely ignore learning a great
deal about their neighbors, and focus most of their
time and attention on what's going on Main Street.
I think that's all well and good, but as I said earlier,
I think much more of this is coming together. So virtually,
we are much closer, and practically speaking, I think
we are much closer. So I would argue very strongly--of
course, it's my chosen career, to be engaged in international
affairs. But I would argue much more strongly that
much more of our future, much more of our livelihood,
and much more of our survival--
Much more of what happens in the world, will depend
on our ability as leaders of the world, to look out
for our own position, to understand what's going on
in other places, to know in fact where problems will
arise, and to deal with them. And for that, we have
to have popular support. And indeed, we have new tools
to do that. We have our traditional educational system,
but it is now enhanced by the marvelous networking
that can take place--By the electronic media's total
dominance, perhaps, of our free time, or a lot of
it. I hope for good, but often for ill, or, one wants
to make judgments about these things--But it is, and
these are remarkable didactic and remarkable teaching
devices, to get people much more engaged in understanding
what's happening.
I think that there will never be a perfect answer
to all of these questions, but I would hope the balance
would shift, and that the balance would shift in ways
that I think are implied in your question, and are
certainly explicit in my answer--That we do need to
be part of the world, we do need to be much more engaged,
and there is a great deal out there. I don't think
that that is for purposes of disdaining our own country,
or its own development, or in any way negating the
values or the importance of what we are doing domestically--Which
are critical for a lot of us, but I do think that
we could achieve a better balance than we have achieved.
And I think that our continued failures, perhaps,
to produce a crop of people able to manage a foreign
language with some facility, just one, among a broader
number of our peoples.
I think that there is, and there has been, and maybe
this is a myth, that maybe your high school will disprove
it--a traditional lack of significant knowledge about
geography in the world, in its best sense. And a significant
sense that foreign history, particularly in areas
which are not culturally part of our traditional tradition,
if I could put it that way, the other traditions,
tend to be disrespected and ignored. So very few Americans
know a lot, either about Middle Eastern or Southeast
Asian history or culture. On the other hand, these
are very important areas for us, or China, or Russia.
So I think those are important things to keep in mind,
and I would hope that we would find it capable of
moving in that direction in the future, and I think
the quote is entirely right.
Alison: Thank you, Undersecretary. The political
philosopher, Michael Sandel wrote, "A better philosophical
ground for pluralism is to appreciate the distinctive
goods that these different ways of life represent,
rather than to just tolerate those differences."
To what extent do you feel our current foreign policy
really appreciates the distinctions of other cultures?
And do you feel a need, or room for improvement?
Mr. Pickering: Always room for improvement,
first. Secondly, I have a feeling, and certainly in
my career it's been true, that the day when you don't
learn twenty new things is the day that you are beginning
to fade. So in fact, I do think, and that relates
directly to my last question, my answer to the last
question, which I think anticipated yours.
Because I do think that there are a number of areas
where cultural sensitivity and cultural knowledge
is extremely important. And in foreign policy decisions,
we rely very heavily on our people who become expert
in the countries concerned, and how a particular approach
will play.
Well one particularly difficult question for all of
us now is Islam. It's a religion which is the fastest
growing in the United States. It is a religion which
most people in the United States know very little
about, and study less. It is a religion, the understanding
of which is broadly captured in terrorism, in combat,
in outrage, and in a series of social peculiarities
that tend not to be necessarily the central focus
of modern Islam in most places in the world.
Plural marriage, and disdaining of women, which I
think unfortunately is still true, heavily in Islam,
but not necessarily totally throughout all Islamic
cultures.
And I think we need to find ways to understand Islam
in its many variations, to know how it influences
people's thinking. To know and understand that in
some Islamic cultures, particularly among Arabs, there
is a very strong faith in the traditional sense, in
the importance of the Word. Sometimes as a substitute
for the reality of follow-up action. And one has to
understand that in order to negotiate with people,
to know where it is you want to come out, and to put
an emphasis on how you bring people together, from
such different cultures.
Those are just a few examples. It is extremely interesting
in some ways, that people who are seemingly very close
to us sometimes, have very different cultural attitudes,
about various questions, and how they relate to issues.
I've found in Central America, having spent, before
that, a large number of years in both Arab and other
Muslim countries, how interesting it was that the
social customs of Central America, inherited from
Spain, that had only expelled the Arabs twenty years
before, were so influenced by many of those same cultural
traditions, and still are today.
Ideas about honor, ideas about family, again, ideas
about rights and wrongs, had a long historical tradition
in the fact that Spain was a multicultural and multilingual
country at the time the settlers first came and brought
those traditions. But many of those have persisted
throughout Latin America. And the historical basis,
plus first-hand acquaintance (with those cultures),
are better ways to understand those (traditons). I
think you could see, as you go along, in this world,
that not only sometimes are your close neighbors a
little different, but sometimes people who are neighbors
but a long distance away, with a much different tradition,
are a little different, and it really helps to understand--To
be able to talk and converse, and to get a sense of
how people tend to look at things.
It's also in my view important to show a sign of awareness
and respect, in cultures where gestures and actions
are sometimes resented. One of the most interesting
things was some years ago, we had an American expert
working for us at this Department, training our young
officers on just the question of how different cultures
felt about standing close or far from you. And Latins
always like to be close, and Americans would always
be backed into the wall. American cultural distance
was different than Latin cultural distance.
But it explained a lot of things about how people
felt uncomfortable talking to each other, because
they were not yet ready to adjust their notion, and
their knowledge, of about how far you should be face
to face when you were having a conversation with a
friend. Those are minor, but sometimes interesting,
in the Islamic world and Muslim world, you have to
be very careful how you use your left hand.
And you don't hand people things with your left hand,
and being left-handed, I've had to discipline myself.
In Russia, you don't shake hands across another person's
handshake, for example, or it's bad luck.
So if you, you know, you learn a lot of very interesting
things, some of which, of course, are forgotten in
the society, but some of them run very deeply, and
some of them obviously put people off, just as I think
if people (from other countries) did things that we
considered to be outrageous--somewhat crazy, it would
put us off initially, in terms of trying to establish
contact and knowledge, even if because we didn't understand
that that was part of their cultural way of doing
things.
Katie: Having seen so much of the world, and
having been involved with so many different cultures,
and different forms of government, what are some of
the things that you've learned about America from
seeing our country and its policies from these different
vantage points?
Mr. Pickering: Well I think it's an interesting
and challenging question. I would say, of course,
that the metaphor is one that can only lead to mass
confusion, if you'll allow it-- I think that since
I have made it an important part of my life, to see
as much of this country as I can, despite the fact
that I had relatively few opportunities, I'm proud
to say that I have visited all of the states, and
spent time in each of them, even if fleeting.
Secondly, I think that it is a significant and interesting,
to note that despite our many differences, there are,
and I've outlined some of those, in the basic question,
first question on foreign policy--Significant values
that are well held across this country, that make
a big difference. I've been increasingly impressed
at the degree to which in the last fifty years we
have become multicultural, for good and bad, and I
think people will argue both ways.
It is interesting to note that now our second language
is Spanish, that in twenty or thirty years, we will
be the largest Spanish-speaking country in the hemisphere,
larger even than Mexico. Of course, this makes a huge
difference in how we look at things. I have had a
sense that we have enough commitments to our basic
principles, and we have had enough dynamic of people
making changes within our own society, to recognize
that we are, in that sense, in my view, a very healthy
society with very serious problems.
We have problems that people marched on the Mall about
a couple of days ago. We have problems of how to deal
with our racial diversity, which are not solved.
I can tell you as a matter of pride, we have made
a lot more progress than most countries around the
world, in dealing with that fundamentally difficult
issue for many people. I think that we have problems
about how to assure prosperity and we have done a
remarkable job, and still have huge numbers of people
living in poverty, and the tremendous tension that
exists around the world and in our own country, between
what society must do outside of government, and what
government's responsibility is one that you see consistently
and constantly. If you could see the total failures
of government to meet the demands in many countries,
and particularly the communist states, which it was
portrayed as an ideal, and then differed totally from
the reality.
In other countries, some of which include our own,
which have a different idea, that the government which
governs least is the government which governs best.
On the other hand, the sense that I have, that we
have even in our own, a great tendency to ignore the
places where government makes a difference. I don't
mean in running industries, but I mean in providing
a sense out of the community, of what is the appropriate
regulation that has to apply to our economy. Economies
that run roughshod are economies which eventually
ignore all social values. On the other hand, the governments
which tend to run everything, tend too be subjected
to bureaucracy and corruption and failure. Somewhere
along the continuum, one has to find for each government
a place that I think we are still engaged happily,
in a very dynamic struggle to try to define that for
ourselves, and it will continue. I think it's extremely
good. I think that if we ever get frozen in time,
on that issue, then we will have lost the dynamic
and the versatility, and the great variety of change
it will bring--And we've lost a lot of basically,
in the sense of health of our own political system,
that people can come in and make changes, and move
things in different directions.
I found it very interesting, when I was in Russia,
I traveled a lot. I had an opportunity to visit almost
sixty of their 89 equivalents of states, I was in
a lot of them, but not all of them. I had opportunities
to sit and talk with the governors, and with their
coterie of, some of them appointed, and some elected.
We talked a lot about these problems, because the
Russians still did not have a serious understanding,
in my view, of either modern economics, or how and
what (inaudible) it related to political life. They
had a tendency to believe that communism had caused
them a lot of problems, but it also brought them a
lot of equity. None of them wanted to go back to the
police state, press censorship, but a lot of them
wanted to guarantee that because, when I was there,
people were eight or nine months behind on wages--So
a situation in which the economy could actually pay
the people who were working in it a sufficient amount
to survive. And so they were struggling with this
particular issue. Unfortunately, their answer was
the easy one. Since, when communism died, all the
rules died, and it was very hard to put in any new
rules. They wanted to operate in the world of no rules,
but in fact, in terms of government officials pretty
much had free rein to do what they wanted to do. Some
of them terribly abused the system, and we all know
corruption is a horrible problem in countries like
Russia that will have to be gotten over.
No society I suppose is ever free of corruption, but
I hope in our society we can reduce it to as little
as possible, because it introduces an enormous burden
for the society, and one that makes it very hard to
function effectively. For that you need, obviously,
a government that has its own place, clearly fixed
in the political system of bureaucracy that is efficient
and effective.
As much as people like to run in election years against
the American federal bureaucracy, being a member of
it, I've come to respect it and understand it. To
know that it does make mistakes, but probably is so
much better than other bureaucracies around the world,
by comparison, that it represents, I think, an enormous
advantage for us. Happily, our bureaucracy as a percentage
of the working public is pretty small. But I do think
that in many things, people tend to complain about
the government, without recognizing the enormous number
of things that would not function effectively if we
didn't have somebody there--
At least trying to find a way, both to enforce reasonable
regulations, and continue to cut them down, which
is important, and to find ways to do better. What
it is that has to be done by people collectively,
which is after all, the government rather than by
individuals alone. But that's a whole subject for
a new philosophical discourse, so let me quit and
get another question.
Alicia: Given your job, I would imagine that
you've been in the position of often having to bring
together people from different cultures, that have
distinctly different ways of thinking. So how do you
effectively organize a group of culturally different
people, so that they will listen to and agree with
each other, and understand each other, and then work
towards a mutually satisfactory agreement?
Mr. Pickering: Okay, well I do that every day
in this building.
Mr. Malliard: You don't have to leave town-(laughter)
Mr. Pickering: I don't have to leave town,
although it's more fun when you leave town, so sometimes,
when you get people from very distinctive and different
cultures, the sense of mutual appreciation and the
willing ness to be more open, is a great deal different
than when you get them from a bureaucracy that tends
to work together and fight together, fairly frequently.
Where you need to find your way through a set of problems.
My (inaudible) in those kinds of human interactions,
that if you can as a leader, help to define and bring
people together on a goal, what they're there for--
And what they want to talk about, then I think you
can help to break down a lot of the difficulties that
exist. And in my view, people who are able to find
a few areas of agreement are then able to discuss
differences in a much clearer way-and in a much more
respectful way. I also think that it is extremely
important in those kinds of discussions that you have
to get people to try to park their emotions at the
door.
And try to work with you on a clear appreciation of
the substance involved. And that's difficult because
some individuals believe in fact they can get farther
if they can be more emotional. And if they can appeal
to (inaudibl) ways to use what I would call their
virtual elbows, to move things around. So you will
see that, and I think it's up to the leader, obviously,
to kind of put into perspective, as that process goes
ahead, where each piece fits--And where each part
of the challenge comes out. But I think it's extremely
useful to ask people the penetrating questions about
their points of view, so that you can get them to
explain where they are and in depth. I think it is
also extremely important to do everything you can
to get as full an understanding of both the problems
at hand and how people are looking at them, before
you try to come to premature conclusions, or bring
about a consensus. I think that in any meeting of
that sort, if you want to end up somewhere, there
comes a point where you stop listening, start challenging,
and then get the group beginning to focus on where
it wants to come out or how it can move. I think it's
also useful to try to get people in the group who
you know are pretty responsible, but who are not part
of the centerpiece of the conflict, to begin to articulate
outcomes for you, as well as to try to do that yourself.
But these are all things that I think you will see,
from grade school. In fact, I have one thesis that,
if you understand child psychology, you understand
a lot about modern diplomacy.
That there are countries who often are invigorated
to take positions contrary to other countries, really
because the second country has already taken a position
first.
And you want to be very careful about that, but occasionally
we see that, that people take positions because they
don't want to be next to Country X, or they don't
want to be put in a position of being supportive--And
some of this comes from more sophisticated reasons,
but (inaudible) just pure cousin contrariness. Some
of it has to do with the fact that domestic political
environment in a country, and may be such that in
order to stay alive as a political leader, he has
to be seen to be taking his own position.Or he has
to be seen not to be subservient to the positions
of Country X and Country Y. But it is interesting,
and I'm taking you a little further from the question,
but I think that it's interesting. I always thought
it would be fun to write a book on diplomacy and child
psychology.
Laura: You were speaking previously about the
changing role of communication, in our government.
What effect do you think the combination of an almost
instantaneous communication, and an increasing public
demand for information and quick response to crises
(inaudible), has had on the quality of decision-making
in your work?
Mr. Pickering: I think of course, that will
have to be judged by the historians. But one factor
that is extremely important, that grows out of this
nexus that you've so well described, is the fact that
issues that used to be third and fourth order questions,
are now first and second order issues. what the United
States foreign policy works on is both what the leadership
of the country thinks is important for the future
of the country, but also, increasingly, what the public
is now demanding that the leadership work on. Because
they are aware of the nature of the problem, it's
horrendous consequences, and indeed, the significance
of that set of issues for a large number of people.
Now I could tell you historically, this probably was
first realized in its most significant form, when
fifteen years ago, one of the great droughts in the
Horn of Africa, suddenly became the centerpiece of
successive evening news programs in the United States.
And people grew alert to it, that it was no longer
possible for the United States to say we won't play,
we can't afford it, we're not part of it. Huge numbers
of children, emaciated and dying, were daily shown
on television screens in Somalia and Ethiopia, and
the United States with others took the lead in finding
an answer to that particular problem--At least in
the immediate sense, in terms of food and medical
relief. And I think increasingly, we've had to call
that the CNN factor. Increasingly it tends to put
new issues on the screen, make it much harder for
us to sit in Washington and say that isn't really
important in terms of the traditional definition of
America's vital interests--
So we won't support it, we won't go to the Congress,
and we will just sort of hide in our offices on that
one. And that has changed a lot.
But it also means, interestingly enough, that there
are some questions that the international media chooses
either not to portray, or not to focus upon with the
same degree of intensity.
We had an interesting one the other day. We are spending
a lot of time on Sierra Leone, in part because there
was a horrendous, multi-sided civil war, with huge
atrocities committed by some of the armed groups.
And it brought all of that home to the American public.
But interestingly enough, not 2,000 miles to the north,
in Algeria, happily, it's diminishing, but we have
had a similar atrocity-ridden conflict going on inside
the country--Which has not received the kind of attention
and focus, in part because it's hard to get to Algeria,
and in part because they knew the news media had other
things to do, for a long period of time. And in part,
because the government of Algeria wanted to deal with
this issue itself, with only limited foreign help.
And in part, because I think the governor of Algiers
was embarrassed enough by the difficulties to want
to keep it out of the public media eye.
But for all of those reasons, and maybe more that
I haven't analyzed yet, that conflict doesn't get
either the international attention, or support, in
terms of either human relief, or finding negotiated
ways for settlement, or indeed, providing international
military forces to help deal with it--That the other
does. And so we see around the world, issues of that
sort. Rarely, however, do we find the Algerias; increasingly,
we find the Sierra Leones, or the Horn of Africa crises,
to become the dominant ones. And I think it is, it's
changing the nature of how we deal with conflicts,
we're much more challenged in public, to say what
we're doing, almost immediately. We're much more required
to be accountable to the public and the Congress on
those issues. We have to move rapidly to deal with
them. In a sense, it makes it much harder for us to
be selective about priorities when it comes to insufficient
funds, which is a huge challenge for us.
Dante: John Lucas, a professor of history at
Chestnut College, said, "Nations have purposes and
self-ascribed destinies." If you have the opportunity
to formulate a purpose and a destiny for America in
this time, what would it be?
Mr. Pickering: Well I think that our destiny,
I hope, is to take what we think is the best political
system that has yet been developed, and the best economic
system that has yet been developed, to make it better.
And to find ways, if we can, to help other countries
around the world, who have similar hopes and aspirations,
to both use and adopt and be supported in trying to
reach the same kinds of goals that we have--Which
are, I think, the very egalitarian, very utopian,
to find a way to make as perfect a country as we can,
both in terms of political representation, and in
terms of personal satisfaction, and personal gain
in its social development.
We have a long way to go domestically, that hasn't
hindered us from being willing to help people internationally,
and I don't think it should, but I think that those
are very broad, very, as I say, millennial in their
scope--But I think that they have tended to inform
the best in this country over a long period of time.
And I think we need to do it with a sense of humility,
rather than a sense of hubris. And I think it's as
important for us to do what we can, if we believe
that we are doing things as well as we possibly can,
to work with others and make sure that that also happens.
And it's been part of our national vocation, I think,
since the First World War, to involve ourselves increasingly
internationally, in those sorts of endeavors.
Kyle: Undersecretary Pickering, drawing on
your experience, what is the most important piece
of advice you can give to us as young American citizens?
Mr. Pickering: Come into the foreign service.
It's a wonderful career.
Mr. Malliard: All of us?
Mr. Pickering: With the questions you asked,
you all have a future in the Foreign Service, without
a doubt. It's a wonderful career, for me and for all
of my colleagues.
It's demanding, it's rewarding, I think, in a personal
sense, not necessarily in a monetary sense, though
I've never been in a position to have even my family
or me placed at risk.
It's highly competitive, in the sense that it's competitive
for entry, through examination, it's competitive for
promotion. We've adopted a military system for our
personnel system and promotion. So we all get a chance
to serve on boards, to review all of the people who
are eligible for promotion, and make selections. But
I think it's also a tough system, puts a lot of responsibility
in individuals, you're often overseas and have to
make decisions, at fairly short notice, about what
to do. You can't always call home.
It gives you an awful lot of responsibility, particularly
for leadership, in terms of both the lives and safety
of the people who work for you, and for an awful lot
of Americans, sometimes in other countries. But it
gives you an awful lot of pride in being able to represent
your country to a foreign government, and to try to
do it as well as you can, and to talk to foreign citizens,
many of whom obviously are extremely interested in
our views and what we're doing. And it gives you plenty
of opportunity to debate American policy, and defend
it sometimes under very critical and difficult conditions.
And you can also live with health hazards. And terrorist,
and other difficulties. It's well worth all of the
time and investment.
Tell me a little bit about your high school?
Laura: It's really small. We are the, with
the exception of (inaudible), we are at the junior
and senior classes. It's a very small, private school,
and we have a big focus in drama, actually, theatre.
Right now, we're working on the (inaudible), which
happens (inaudible) after we get back.
Mr. Pickering: Where are you located?
Alison: We're near Santa Cruz and San Jose.
We're in the mountains.
Mr. Pickering: My cultural antenna would have
never said California, it wouldn't have said California.
Are you all Californians? Well, you're great representatives.
Think about coming and joining us here at State.
Group: Thank you very much.
(End of recorded interview)
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